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…me   f g e  es  ge  us, whe e  hey  el  qu sh by p   c ple  he use 
of their reason, are only enabled by their vigor of the mind to work 
themselves the deeper into error and absurdity.2 
 
Richard Rorty once defined Romanticism as the thesis that ‘what is most important 
for human life is not what propositions we believe but what vocabulary we use’.3 
His is one of many possible definitions and not very different from the 
understanding of Romanticism that I rely on in this article. Historical accounts relate 
Romanticism to the rejection of the Enlightenment worldview that started with 
Herder. Romantics, the common explanation goes, protested against the 
Enlightenment faith in the capacity of logical thinking, ultimately reason, to 
improve the human lot. They rejected the belief that rationality was shared by 
humans as members of the same species and argued that human reasoning 
capacities derive from membership of various collectives such as ethnicity, race or 
culture. A version of this view, already present in Herder, is the claim that all 
human thinking is verbal and in a language; such a position precludes the 
p ss b l  y  h     e c uld h  e   y  de s wh ch c      be   med w  h     e’s 
linguistic community.  
The rejection of universal human rationality goes hand in hand with the 
rejection of the idea that human values could be shared independently of one’s 
membership of a community. It is the community, Romantics argued, that generates 
all human values. The culture of a nation (Nationalbildung) de e m  es   e’s   s e f   
pleasant and beautiful, Herder claimed, and it is a waste of time to talk about 
European ceremonies with a Chinese or Italian music with a Turk.4 He was not 
saying that different individuals find different things pleasant or beautiful, but 
rather that such views are uniform within a group and differ between groups. 
Ultimately, this suggests that human groups are comparable to animal species, some 
of which are attracted to certain types of smell or food and others which are not. The 
same is meant to apply to other kinds of values. It includes the rejection of the view 
that some rights, for instance the right to life, may belong to individuals 
independently of the context in which they live. Rather, the idea is that individuals 
 
1   sh uld l  e    e p ess my g     ude      u se de   mbe  ,         l e   , Nick Zangwill and Ian 
Verstegen for insightful discussions about the topic of this article; to Unitec Institute of Technology and 
H     d Ce  e  f    e   ss  ce S ud es ‘  T    ’ for the support they provided to the project and to 
Karen Wise for her help with written English.   
2 David Hume, The History of England, vol. 5, Philadelphia: Porter & Coats, 1875, 85. 
3 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, 142.  
4 Johann Gottfried Herder, Kalligone, Weimar: Hermann Bo  hlaus Nachfolger, 1955, 175. 
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conceive of having certain rights because they live in a certain context. Consider the 
Samurai belief that the best way to try a new sword is to behead with it the first 
unknown stranger one happens to meet.5 (A known person, friend or foe, could not 
be used for the purpose because the judgment would not be disinterested.) Within 
such an ethical code, individuals obviously do not have the right to life if they 
happen to encounter an unknown Samurai who has just purchased a new sword. 
Assuming that all norms are context-generated, it is impossible to say anything 
against this particular custom. In his 1814 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit, Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny argued that legality reflects the specific character of a nation, like its 
language and morals.6 As Frederic Beiser describes it, Savigny denied that human 
beings can have their nature before they start participating in society.7 From such a 
p s     , C   es’  b l       f hum   s c  f ces du   g h s c  ques   f e  c  w s 
just another act of oppression that he inflicted on the Aztecs.  
 
Defining Romanticism 
 
For the purposes of this paper, I propose to define the Romantic worldview as the 
thesis that human intellectual capacities result exclusively from membership of a 
collective, such as culture, ethnicity, linguistic group or similar—in other words, 
that no aspect of human reasoning, deciding, values or intellectual lives belongs to 
humans as humans, but is always derived from a group. The definition requires 
some fine-tuning. Contextualization is an important tool of historical understanding 
in general, but one needs to differentiate between contextualization and Romantic 
stereotyping. There is nothing particularly Romantic about the view that available 
contacts and intellectual exchange in a specific context may enable or delimit the 
 h ugh s   d bel efs  f   d   du ls. H  dly   y  e c uld de y  h  . Tych     che’s 
astronomical observations enabled Kepler to describe mathematically the 
movements of planets; the lack of available mathematical and physical knowledge 
prevented Archimedes from developing quantum physics. In such cases it is 
possible to stipulate the specific knowledge (contacts, books available in a specific 
community and so on) that enabled or whose lack prevented specific intellectual 
creativity. The Romantic thesis, however, would be that human reasoning capacities 
are constitutionally determined by collective membership in such a way that 
individual interaction cannot change anything—just as no amount of training can 
help dogs see the colour red. The young Panofsky thus claimed that Polygnotus 
could not have conceived of nor painted a naturalistic landscape, because his mental 
 
5   y  dgley, ‘O  T y  g Ou  O e’s New Sw  d’,      y  dgley, Heart and Mind: the varieties of 
moral experience, Brighton: Harvester, 1981, 69-75.  
6 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fu r Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg: 
Mohr und Zimmer, 1814, 8.   
7 Frederic Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition, Oxford: O f  d U   e s  y P ess, 2011, 222.  e se ’s 
chapters about Justus Mo  ser (63-96) and Savigny (214-252) contain very good descriptions of this 
position.  
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capacities were predetermined that way.8 Panofsky did not state the specific skills or 
knowledge that Polygnotus lacked in order to paint a naturalistic landscape; we do 
not even know whether Polygnotus possibly made a landscape painting that has not 
been preserved. Rather, presumably because no ancient Greek landscape paintings 
are known of, Panofsky assumed that as an ancient Greek painter Polygnotus was 
incapable of conceiving of a naturalistic landscape. Similar claims that certain ideas 
were inconceivable to the individuals belonging to certain groups simply because 
 hey bel  ged     h se g  ups, p  l fe   e, f     s   ce,    Osw ld Spe gle ’s 
Decline of the West.9 Spe gle ’s ce    l  hes s  s  h     d   du ls’  e s    g c p c   es 
are mere manifestations of their roles within specific cultures. Russian culture, for 
instance, is based on horizontality, and since the vertical dimension is inconceivable 
to Russians, no Russian can be an astronomer. (259, 921) Similarly, a real Russian 
c      u de s   d D  w  ’s  he  y  f e  lu    . (31)    h P   fs y   d Spe gle  
thus argued that members of certain groups cannot form certain ideas because they 
are members of those groups, even when it is impossible to stipulate any specific 
reasons (e.g. the knowledge they lack) for this alleged incapacity.  
It is fair to say that it is impossible to conceive of Romanticism in 
  depe de ce  f  he  hes s  h   membe sh p  f   c llec   e de e m  es   d   du ls’ 
reasoning capacities. Nevertheless, the definition of the Romantic worldview 
proposed here will be reproached for including too much that does not belong to 
actual historical Romanticism. It lacks historical specificity: historically, 
Romanticism was a particular, mainly German, cultural phenomenon at the turn of 
the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Romantic worldview as defined here 
would include Spengler and the young Panofsky as well as even more modern 
articulations of the same positions. It would include, for instance, the view that 
dominated much of English-speaking scholarship in the final decades of the 
 we   e h ce  u y,  h   cul u e    l  gu s  c c mmu   y sl ce   d s  uc u e   e’s 
reality so that even the most elementary perceptions are always already 
p ede e m  ed by   e’s cul u  l b c ground.  
The answer to this reproach is that this is precisely the wider perspective 
that I want to examine in this paper. My analysis pertains to such a wider picture. 
The phenomenon that interests me here are scholarly claims about the collective 
determi        f   d   du ls’  e s    g c p c   es whe  such de e m        
(limitations) cannot be proved, justified or documented. I call such positions 
Romantic in order to recognise their original historical articulation—but the paper 
analyses the general form of the argument and its conclusions are intended to have 
wider significance. With some exceptions, most of my examples, indeed, do not 
come from the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century but derive from 
German (art) historiography between 1890 and 1950, the era between Bismarck and 
Adenauer. I could have chosen examples from a different period—such as American 
scholarship of the 1990s—but the chosen era is well suited since it abounds in 
 
8 Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, in Erwin Panofsky, Deutschsprachge Aufsätze, vol. 2, 
1019-1034, 1023: ‘weil er—kraft einer sein psychologisches Wollen vorherbestimmenden 
Notwendigkeit—nichts anders als eine unnaturalistische Landschaft wollen konnte’. 
9 Oswald Spengler, Untergang des Abendlandes, Munich: DTV 2003. 
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examples of the kind of argument I want to analyse. The 1890s was the period of the 
rise of the collectivist worldview in the intellectual life of German-speaking 
c u    es.    h s     g  phy, K  l   mp ech ’s p lem cs b  ugh   b u   he 
replacement of the Rankean faith in Providence by a faith in human collectives as 
the determining force of historical processes.10 Lamprecht believed that he could 
describe the cultural stages of social development using a method resembling 
statistical induction, but without statistical surveys: the method was supposed to 
 ely me ely     he h s      ’s  mp ess     b u  ge e  l   e ds.11 About the same 
time, Alois Riegl introduced the concept of (collective) artistic will, Kunstwollen, that 
motivated artistic creativity and was assumed to belong to a group.12 Heinrich Ritter 
von Srbik observed that in the 1890s the population of the Reich came into a state of 
se  ch f      ew   de   h   ‘  cluded   c mp ehe s  e  e ec      f  he l be  l 
b u ge  s w  ld  ew …  he e    se p pul s         l sm dep   ed  f  he hum   s  
sp      f  he e    f l be  l sm … fe    f l fe led       esc pe     he dem   sm  f 
p we , wh le Ch  s      y l s    s f  ce’.13 Vice versa, after 1945 the collectivist 
worldview lost its original appeal to the German intelligentsia: if the totality of 
human creativity and mental processes were always already predetermined by the 
nature of the group one belongs to, then this would apply to political systems as 
well. The undesirable implication in that case would be that the Third Reich was a 
spontaneous manifestation of the nature of German people. 14 
  
 
10 See Karl Lamprecht, Alte und Neue Richtungen in der Geisteswissenschaft, Berlin: Gaerther, 1896. 
11 K  l   mp ech , ‘W s  s  Kul u gesch ch e?  e    g zu e  e  emp   sche  H s     ’, Deutsche 
Zeitschrift fu r Geschichtswissenschaft, 1:1, 1896/7, 75-150, section vii. 
12 It is possible to argue that in his 1893 Stilfragen. Grundlegung zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik, Berlin: 
Richard Carl Schmidt 1923, he still assumed that Kunstwollen belongs to individuals. As Karl Swoboda 
and Otto Pa  cht pointed out (see their Introduction to   egl’s 1897/1898 Historische Grammatik der 
bildenden Ku nste, Karl Swoboda and Otto Pa  cht, (eds, Graz: Herman Bo  hlaus Nachfolge, 1966, 9-16, 12) 
in the Historische Grammatik he talks about ethnic groups as bearers of Kunstwollen. In his Spa tro  mische 
Kunstindustrie nach den Funden in O  sterreich-Ungarn, 2 vols, Vienna: K-K Hof-und-Staatsdruckerei, 1901, 
an era can be the bearer of Kunstwollen (vol. 1, 24).  
13 Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart, Munich: 
Verlag F. Bruckmann, 1950, 245-246: ‘V   e w  1890   , ...      d s deu sche  e chs  l  ... u  e  
Zeichen eines nervösen Hastens, das reich war an dem Gefühl einer Zeitenwende, an der Sehnsucht 
nach einer neuen Ordnung, einer weitreichen Abkehr und Überwindung der bürgerlichen liberalen 
Weltbilder, des nur naturwissenschaftlichen sowohl wie des idealistischen, des Positivismus und der 
neukantischen Philosophie. ... Zugleich erwächst ein Nationalismus, der frei ist vom Humanita  tsgeist 
der liberalen A  , ‘   l  sch’ ges    , m   s    em   ss sche  Selbs bewuß se   u d fe   dem  l e  
Europa- und Abendlandgedanken.  ... Der Sinn für die Wirklichkeit des Metaphysischen ging vielen 
Deutschen verloren, die Lebensangst führte zu einem Sichflu  chten in die Dämonie der Macht, das 
Ch  s e  um  e l   we  h      seele le  e de  K  f ’.  
14 Even a strong proponent of collectivism and historicism such as Friedrich Meinecke sought to deny 
such implications after 1945. In his Deutsche Katastrophe he endeavoured to throw exclusive blame for 
H  le ’s   se    p we     H  de bu g’s dec s   s,  hus     d  g  he  mpl c     s  f  he c llec    s    ew 
that ethnicity and social context determine the thinking and decisions of individuals. Friedrich 
Meinecke, Die Deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen, Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus 
Verlag 1946, 95, 138. 
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Race and ethnicity 
 
Racial and ethnicity-based theories of human creativity are a particularly good 
example of the phenomenon that I want to describe here—the situations when 
authors cannot justify, but they nevertheless make, claims that the intellectual and 
creative capacities of individuals derive from the collective membership of these 
individuals. In art history, a classic of this kind of reasoning is Heinrich Wo  lffl  . ‘   
 s e sy    see’, W  lffl   s ys, ‘ h    he s me eleme    s    be f u d    d ffe e   
[artistic] styles of a country, that originate from land and race, so that, e.g. Italian 
baroque is not only different from but also the same as the Renaissance, because the 
  c  l  ype  f  he    l    m    h   c e  ed     em   ed u  l e ed’.15 There is no 
sensitivity to form that is independent from the historical situation, he says; 
 e e  heless ‘ ll s c  l g c l e pl       s  em    pe  phe  l,  s l  g  s  he ce    l 
issue has not been addressed, and this is the national ways of forming and 
 ep ese    g’. (213) Ques    s pe       g        onal sensitivity become unavoidable, 
in his view, as soon as taste for form is addressed in relation to spiritual-moral 
moments.16 A specific identity of national spirit asserted itself through all the 
changes that German art underwent through its history, Wo lfflin says.17  
Statements like these proliferate in German art historiography in the period 
f  m  he 1890s  h  ugh 1945.    Ku   Ge s  e ’s Sondergotik, we read that artistic 
style is not a matter of history but of race.18 According to Kurt Karl Eberlein in his 
Was ist deutsch in der deutschen Kunst, art is created by the soil and blood of a race.19 
Albert Erich Brickmann in his Geist der Nationen stated that conflicts and tensions 
through which Western art developed and acquired its form are founded in racial 
biology.20 Art is the pouring out of the deepest instincts of a race, he said. (20) In his 
Gotik und Renaissance, Dagobert Frey claimed that mental capacities were not merely 
different from individual to individual but reflect ethnic differences and the 
differences between eras.21 In his 1942 Englisches Wesen im Spiegel seiner Kunst Frey 
 ssumed s    g c us l  el     sh p be wee         s ’s e h  c b c g  u d   d  he 
visual properties of his artworks. This led him to a series of bizarre attempts to 
reconstruct the precise tribal ancestry of various artists on the basis of the visual 
properties of their works.22 For instance, he endeavoured to differentiate between 
 he E gl sh   d Flem sh  spec s  f V  b ugh’s w   s,   d   gued  h   H g   h w s 
more Celtic than Germanic. (218, 306) 
 
15 Heinrich Wo lfflin, Italien und das deutsche Formgefu hl, Munich: Bruckmann1931, 6. 
16 Heinrich Wo lfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Munich: Mu  nchener Verlag, 1948, 9. 
17 Heinrich Wo lfflin, Das Erkla  ren von Kunstwerken, Leipzig: E. A. Seemann, 1921. 
18 Gerstner, Kurt: Deutsche Sondergothik. Eine Untersuchung u  ber das Wesen der deutschen Baukunst im 
spa ten Mittelalter, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaft 1969, ix, see also 133. 
19 Eberlein, Kurt Karl: Was ist deutsch in der deutschen Kunst, Leipzig: Verlag F. A Seemann, 1933, 9. 
20 Albert Erich Brickmann, Geist der Nationen. Italiener-Franzosen-Deutsche, Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Campe, 1938, 20. 
21 Dagobert Frey, Gotik und Renaissance als Grundlagen der modernen Weltanschauung, Augsburg: Dr. 
Benno Filser Verlag, 1929, xxviii. 
22 Dagobert Frey, Englisches Wesen im Spiegel seiner Kunst, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1942. The first page 
of the book has an alternative title: Englisches Wesen in der bildenden Kunst.  
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One will find many examples of such views in the historiography of the era. 
None of these authors can support their theses with more than a couple of examples 
of artworks with some similar characteristics created by artists that shared the same 
ethnic background. Counterexamples, that are easy to find, are suppressed and 
methodology behind these generalising claims is remarkably feeble. At the same 
time, these authors made significant efforts to be wissenschaftlich, they paid great 
attention to proper methodology and scrupulously analysed documents they dealt 
with. And then, in certain matters and when it comes to specific topics, the entire 
scholarly façade disappears and we are presented with the wildest fantasies the 
results of their Forschung. Consider, for instance, the claims that Jesus Christ was 
Aryan. In a very learned and scholarly article published in 1908 in Orientalische 
Litteratur-Zeitung Paul Haupt went into great length to analyse and compare various 
Arabic and Hebrew words only to infer, suddenly, that because there may have been 
some Aryan settlements in Galilee in the eight century BCE, Jesus, who lived there 
eight centuries later, must have been Aryan.23 The same claim was repeated by Hans 
Gu nther in his Rasse und Stil. 24 S me pe ple    le s   hus      H up ’s f ll c  us 
argument seriously at the time—including Adolf Hitler, who thought that Jesus 
could not have been a Jew (and who also believed that Genghis Kahn was Aryan).25 
A different perspective on the origin of Christianity, it should be mentioned, was 
proposed at the time by a Viennese art history professor Josef Strzygowski. In his 
view, Christianity was the original religion of the Germanic North.26 It was 
plagiarised by Jesus, who must have lived in the Jewish diaspora in Iran in his 
youth, where he learnt about it, and then conveyed it to the Romans, who made the 
Roman Church and brought Christianity back to the North. Strzygowski is 
notorious for his extravagant theories, including the claim that the Acropolis 
belongs to Nordic art and that Michelangelo was a Viking.27 Nevertheless, he should 
not be easily discounted—as a professor and emeritus of the Art History 
Department of the University of Vienna, he was certainly a prominent member of 
the academic establishment.  
One normally assumes that people, including scholars, adopt beliefs on 
rational grounds. Sometimes these beliefs are false, and one can see how they were 
rationally derived from false assumptions that the person thought to be true. There 
 
23 P ul H up , P ul, ‘D e    sche Ab u f  Jesu u d Se  e  Ju  ge ’, Orientalische Litterature-Zeitung, 11:5, 
1908, 237-240. 
24 Günther, Hans, K. F., Rasse und Stil,  Munich: J. S. LehmansVerlag, 1926, 60, 113.  
25 Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann der Feldherr werden wollte: Erlebnisse un Erfahrungen des Vorgesetzten 
Hitlers im I. Weltkrieg un seines spa  teren perso nslichen Adjutanten, Hanover 1964, 205, cited according to 
  be   We  e: ‘Ad lf H  le ’s A   -Sem   sm: A S udy    H s   y   d Psych    lys s’,     e   m   
Wolman, ed., The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History, New York: Harper, 1971, 192-230, 194. 
26 Josef Strzygowski, Das indogermanische Ahnenerbe des deutschen Volkes und die Kunstgeschichte der 
Zukunft, Vienna: Deutscher Verlag fu  r Jugend und Volk, 1941, 78. Josef Strzygowski, Europas 
Machtkunst im Rahmen des Erdkreises. Eine grundlegende Auseinandersetzung u  ber Wesen und Entwicklung 
des zehntausendja hringen Wahnes: Gewaltmacht von Gottes Gnaden statt vo  lkischer Ordnung, Kirche statt 
Glaube, Bildung statt Begabung: vom Nordstandpunkt plabma  ssig in die volksdeutsche Bewegung eingestellt, 
Vienna: Wiener Verlag 1943, 38, 61, 186, 558. 
27 Strzygowski, Ahnenerbe, 17-28. Josef Strzygowski, Die Deutsche Nordseele. Das Bekenntnis eines 
Kunstforschers. Vienna: Adolf Luser Verlag, 1940, 172. 
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are, however, situations when it is impossible to explain rationally how a belief was 
acquired, and in such situations it is reasonable to attempt to explore the irrational 
forces and psychological motivations that may have generated it.  
C  s de  Th m s    ’s cl  m  h t all Germans, by their nature, have a 
sp     e us u de s   d  g  f K   ’s ph l s phy,    h s cl  m  h   F   ce c e  ed 
Gothic from German spirit.28 The latter view is parallel to Wilhelm Worringer’s 
claim that Germanness is conditio sine qua non Gothic.29 Or consider the attribution of 
the spirit of Vikings (as something ultra-Germanic) to Copernicus by Spengler or to 
Van Gogh by Wilhelm Pinder.30 Such remarkable claims would normally disqualify 
their authors as serious men of letters, which we still know they were. But the 
claims become perfectly comprehensible when we take into account that they are 
about the ethnic group that Mann, Worringer, Spengler and Pinder identify with, 
ultimately therefore fantasies about themselves and their own grandiosity. When 
Wilhelm Pinder stated that no Maori but only a European can paint like Gauguin, 
he was actually talking about his own identity.31 He did not assert that only a 
Frenchman (which he himself was not) could paint like Gauguin; rather, he claimed 
that what made Gauguin a good painter was the same essence that he shared with 
G ugu  .  f we c  s de   hese cl  ms’ c p c  y    c     bu e     he    u h  s’ self-
esteem regulation, the motivation to make them becomes obvious. When Wo  lfflin, 
D  řá    d W     ge   hus   sisted that German art was not inferior to Italian, but 
me ely d ffe e  ,    whe  D  řá    s s ed  h     c e   G ee    d   m   ( .e.    -
Germanic) art is not superior to medieval art, these statements deny a specific type 
of perceived inferiority that, their authors are obviously concerned, could be 
attributed to the art of the ethnic group they identify with.32 The statement is, 
ultimately, not motivated by a desire to discuss the comparative evaluation of the 
art of different ethnic groups, but by a motivation to deny the negative implications 
of such evaluation for the self-esteem of their authors as members of one of these 
groups. 
  
 
28 Mann, Thomas: Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Teschenbuch Verlag, 
2009, 190 and 413. 
29 Wilhelm Worringer, Formprobleme der Gotik, Munich: R. Piper, 1920, 29. 
30 Spenlger, Untergang, 425. Wilhelm Pinder, Das Problem der Generation in der Kunstgeschichte Europas, 
Berlin: Frankfurter Verlags-Anstalt 1926, 86. For the German appropriations of Van Gogh, see Ron 
   he m, ‘The ‘Ge m   c’     G gh: A C se S udy  f Cul u  l A  e      ’, Simiolus: Netherlands 
Quarterly for the History of Art, 19 (1989), 277-288. 
31 Wilhelm Pinder: Das Problem der Generation in der Kunstgeschichte Europas, Berlin: Frankfurter Verlags-
Anstalt 1926, 44. 
32  Heinrich Wo lffl  ’s Italien und das Deutsche Formgefühl, Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1931 is fully 
dedicated to this problem. Wilhelm Worringer, Griechentum und Gotik. Vom Weltreich des Hellenismus, 
Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1928, 8-9. F   D  řá ’s  e ec      f  he  e   ss  ce see    D  řá , 
Das Rätsel der Brüder van Eyck, Munich: Artur Rosenauer, 1925, 145, reprint Vienna: WUV, 1999 and 
 ls     hew   mpley, ‘    D  řá : A   H s   y   d  he C  s s  f  de    y’, Art History, 26 (2003), 
214-237, esp. 219.    D  řá , ‘ de l smus u d N  u  l smus    de  G  sche  S ulp u  u d  le e ’, 
      D  řá , Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte, Munich: Piper, 1924, 43-147, 45-46. 
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Self-esteem regulation 
 
It is reasonable to suspect that a scholarly claim is motivated by self-esteem 
regulation when it is irrational, unjustified or poorly argued in comparison with the 
 u h  ’s usu l sch l  ly s   d  ds, wh le,     he s me   me,    p ese  s  he  u h      
the group he or she identifies with in a favourable (or less negative than one might 
have expected) light.33 For instance, the author may make claims that he or she 
would have known to be false, or his or her scholarly arguments may suddenly 
drop below their usual standard when he or she presents a claim about the group he 
or she belongs to. It cannot be just an accidental omission if the author of a carefully 
argued scholarly article makes a serious logical blunder when he attempts to prove 
that Jesus Christ shared with him the same racial background. Some decades ago it 
was popular to argue that various cultures may operate with different logics—the 
beliefs of the African Azande in witches were commonly stated as an example of a 
different kind of rationality. But it would be hard to see in the non-standard 
reasoning practices of German scholars a similar manifestation of cultural diversity, 
since their reasoning mostly follows expected patterns and collapses only in issues 
that pertain to their self-esteem. 
Problems with self-esteem regulation, at the same time, constitute the central 
aspect of narcissistic psycho-pathology. Narcissism was originally conceptualised 
by Freud, in the second half of the twentieth century significant breakthroughs in its 
study were made by Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut, and by today it is a well-
researched pathology in psychiatry and experimental psychology.34 The core aspect 
 
33 Certainly, this is not an absolute rule, in the sense that an author may have had different motivation 
as well. The situation is the same as in the case of any other attribution of motivation to historical 
figures—there is always the possibility that ultimately some alternative explanation may make more 
sense. When reading a report by a Venetian ambassador to the Council of Ten, elementary charity in 
interpretation requires one to assume that he wanted to present the events he witnessed as accurately 
as possible. However, the ambassador may have intentionally misrepresented the situation in order to 
please some powerful members of the Council, and we may learn about this from a letter to his friend. 
Nevertheless, as long as we do not have such a letter, the best we can do is to assume that the 
ambassador wrote his report in good faith. Similarly, it is always possible that some other motivation 
s   ds beh  d             l cl  m  h    ppe  s     ssu ge   h s      ’s   secu    es—but as long as that 
other motivation cannot be documented, we have to rely on what we can justifiably infer. Otherwise 
historical interpretation becomes a free for all business. Strzygowski, for instance, might have written 
his works with the intention to mock Nazi propaganda, but as long as we have no documents that 
suggest this, and we know that he enthusiastically collaborated with Nazi publishers, we have to 
interpret his writings on the basis of what we can read in them. 
34 See Andrew Morrison, ed., Essential Papers on Narcissism, New York: New York University Press, 
1986, for the most important papers on narcissism. See also Elsa Ronningstam, ed., Disorders of 
Narcissism. Diagonstic, Clinical and Empirical Implications, Northvale: Jason Aronson, 2000. Elsa 
Ronningstam, Identifying and Understanding the Narcissistic Personality, Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 
2005. Also, Otto Kernberg and Hans-Peter Hartmann, eds, Narzismus. Grundlagen-Sto rungen-Therapie, 
Stuttgart: Schattauer, 2006. For the connection between psychoanalytic, psychological and psychiatric 
 pp   ches see N c le C   , A     P  cus   d Em ly A sell, ‘N  c ss sm    C  ss   ds: Phe   yp c 
description of pathological narcissism across clinical theory, social/personality psychology and 
psych     c d  g  s s’, Clinical Psychology Review, 28 (2008) 638-656. A good summary of the difference 
be wee  Ke  be g’s   d K hu ’s  pp   ches  s    Gle  G bb  d, Psychodynamic Psychiatry, American 
Psychiatric Press, 2000, 463-489. 
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of narcissism is dysregulated, vulnerable, unstable and fragile self-esteem that is 
maintained by compensatory self-aggrandizement.35 In simple words, individuals 
who need to preserve self-esteem will engage in self-esteem defensive behaviour. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders lists nine symptoms of 
narcissistic personality disorder; not all of them can be explicitly manifested in 
scholarship (for instance, exploitative behaviour or the absence of empathy) but 
g   d  s  y,  he e  gge        f   e’s  ch e eme  s, f    s es  f u l m  ed p we  
and envy can.36 Grandiosity often has the form of self-aggrandizing attributions that 
enhance self-esteem. It generates fantasies that concentrate on being special, 
exceptional and overcompensate for the defects that one believes oneself to have.37 
Psychoanalytic literature describes that narcissism affects interpersonal 
relationships because communication with other individuals is primarily used to 
enhance and protect self-es eem wh le ‘  fe  s   se  ch f   pseud -status, an empty 
series of aspirations that serves no purpose other than self-e h  ceme  ’.38 In the 
context of historiographical work, I will argue, this is precisely what happens with 
scholarship, which takes the form of an opportunity to fabricate self-esteem 
enhancing compensatory narratives. 
  s y ‘   es  he f  m’ bec use  he    e       f  h s p pe   s        d  g  se 
individual historians as narcissists. As mentioned, a number of important 
symptoms of narcissism cannot even be manifested in scholarly writing. The 
aetiology of narcissism is unknown and no amount of study of the childhood of 
individuals can tell us that a person had to become narcissistic.39 The introduction of 
research on narcissism in this context therefore does not constitute an argument ad 
hominem. Also, everyone is narcissistic to a certain degree, and establishing a 
narcissistic motive behind a certain specific statement or belief does not really say 
much more about the person whose motive it is. Rather, the point I want to make is 
that we are dealing with scholarly claims which cannot be understood as having 
been rationally generated, while the motivation to make them becomes fully 
comprehensible only once one takes into account their capacity to enhance their 
 u h  s’ self-esteem. At the same time, there exists a significant corpus of research 
 
35 A comprehensive description is in Ronningstam, Identifying, 69-112. A good summary is in Nancy 
McWilliams, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis, Guilford Press, 1994, 168-188. For the relationship between self-
esteem and narcissism see also Virgil Zeigler-H ll, ‘D sc ep  c es  e wee   mpl c     d E pl c   Self-
Esteem: Implications for Narcissism and Self-Es eem   s  b l  y’ Journal of Personality, 74:1, (2006) 119-
143   d Ch  s     J  d   e   l. ‘Secu e   d Defe s  e H gh Self-Es eem’ Journal of personality and Social 
Psychology, 85:5, 2003, 969-978. See also general desc  p    s    A   ld C  pe , ‘N  c ss sm’   d O    
Ke  be g, ‘F c   s     he Psych    ly  c T e  me    f N  c ss s  c Pe s   l   es’        s  , Papers, 
112-143 and 213-244. 
36 For a discussion of the development of DSM criteria of narcissism see Theodore Mill  , ‘DS  
   c ss s  c Pe s   l  y D s  de . H s    c l  eflec    s   d Fu u e D  ec    s’,          gs  m, 
Disorders, 75-101. 
37 See Ronningstam, Identifying, 78. 
38 Ronningstam, Identifying, 69.  ll  , ‘DS ’, 95. 
39 For aitiology of narcissism see Ronningstam, Identifying 48-69, O    Ke  be g, ‘P  h l g c l 
N  c ss sm   d N  c ss s  c Pe s   l  y D s  de ’          gs  m, Disorders, 29-51, 37-41 as well as 
P ul    Ke  be g: ‘De el pme   l Aspec s  f N  m l   d P  h l g c l N  c ss sm’,          gs  m, 
Disorders,  103-120, 114-117. 
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about such motivation in psychology and psychoanalysis which suggests that we 
are dealing with behaviour that would normally be qualified as a symptom of 
narcissism. More generally, I will argue that the Romantic worldview as defined in 
the opening section of this paper cannot be even articulated without making 
assumptions that are normally regarded as symptoms of narcissistic personality 
structure. My thesis is that the general collectivist assumptions of the Romantic 
worldview harbour significant internal contradictions and that insofar as these 
contradictions were overlooked by its protagonists, they were overlooked in order 
to sustain the p s     s  h   e h  ced  hese p    g   s s’ self-esteem. In other 
words, scholars do not write nonsense that contributes to their self-esteem 
regulation accidentally, but because it contributes to their self-esteem regulation.  
The introduction of psychohistory as a tool necessary in order to understand 
positions in scholarship may raise some eyebrows. Psychohistory—the 
psychoanalytic study of historical figures—was popular in the 1970s, but has lost 
much of its appeal since then.40 The masterpiece of this type of scholarship is Erik 
E   s  ’s Young Man Luther.41 That book presents psychoanalytic explanations of 
     us u usu l m me  s     u he ’s l fe, h s   ge,     e  es,      gs, wh   E  smus 
called furor germanicus. Some psychoanalysts have complained that Erikson 
  e emph s zed  u he ’s    l l  gu ge   d ‘e c eme   l e pe  e ces’    h s 
explanations—but nevertheless, his book provided a valuable psychoanalytic 
pe spec   e     he u usu l  spec s  f  u he ’s pe s   l  y  h    b u d    h s 
biography.42 The b     ls  d scusses  he c   e    f  u he ’s lec u es s de by s de 
w  h psych    ly  c   s gh s, bu  ge e  lly, E   s   p    s  u   h    u he ’s 
systematic theological accomplishments are outside the scope of the book. (249) Its 
target is the explanation of biographical facts and it is not meant to be a contribution 
to intellectual history. The same applies to other prominent writings on 
psychohistory of the era.43 Their intention was not to explain psychoanalytically the 
factors that made scientists, philosophers or men of letters acquire certain beliefs or 
formulate theories, since one would normally expect that the content of these beliefs 
was rationally generated. The problem this paper deals with is, however, what 
happens when scholarly views (of historians, in this case) could not have been 
rationally generated. The interpretative contribution of research on narcissism and 
self-esteem regulation makes it clear that individuals make certain types of claims 
when they need to make them. It provides what seems to be the only available 
credible explanation for the type of irrational scholarly behaviour that I have 
described—and my more general thesis will be that without such narcissistically 
 
40 For psychohistory see Joan Scott, ‘The   c mme su  b l  y  f Psych    lys s   d H s   y’, History 
and Theory, 51:1, 2012, 63-83.  
41 Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther, New York: Norton, 1962. 
42 Peter Loewenberg, Decoding the Past. The Psychohistorical Approach, New York: Alfred Knopff, 1983., 
25;   uce  zl ch: ‘Wh    s Psych -h s   y’    Ge  ge K e    d  e   H.   pp p   , Varieties of 
Psychohistory, New York: Springer, 1976, 17-37, 23 
43 See for instance Loewenberg, Decoding the Past; George Kren and Leon Rappaport, eds, Varieties of 
Psychohistory, New York: Springer, 1976. Bruce Mazlich, ed., Psychoanalysis and History, New York: 
Grosslet and Dunlap, 1971. Benjamin Wolman, The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History, New York: 
Harper, 1971. 
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motivated defence strategies, the motivation to articulate what I have called the 
Romantic worldview becomes incomprehensible.  
 
Narcissism in scholarship: denial, envy and expansive cognitive style 
 
In his Italien und das Deutsche Formgefu hl, Wo llflin described the unease of German 
scholars about the fact that Du rer sought to learn from a foreign art, that of the 
Italian Renaissance.44 This unease that permeates the attitudes towards the 
Renaissance of the German scholarship of the Wilhelmine and Weimar era finely 
illustrates the psychoanalytic descriptions of denial as a defence mechanism.  
The analysis of the irrational aspects of the Romantic worldview presented 
in this paper is de facto an analysis of denials. Psychoanalytic literature provides 
extensive descriptions of the way an encounter with an anxiety situation activates 
instant denial that results in the defensive distortions of perception and cognition.45 
Denial is normally classified as one of the immature defence mechanisms 
(‘ mm  u e’ bec use     el es      l  ge deg ee  f  e l  y d s       )   d 
psychological studies have shown that immature defence styles are associated with 
self-esteem instability.46 It is a simplistic thought process in which a negative marker 
(no, not) is attached to an anxiety arousing thought in order to turn it into 
something less threatening.47 In his extensive presentation of the psychoanalytic 
 he   es  f de   l, The d  e D  p   desc  bes de   l  s ‘   u c  sc  us defe se 
mech   sm  g   s  u ple su  ble  de s,  ffec s   d pe cep    s’ wh ch ‘c uses    
arrest of cognition regarding some h  g d s u b  g     he sub ec ’.48 In such 
situations, the cognitive process is aborted before it can become a verbal thought. (3) 
   D  p  ’s desc  p    ,  he f    sy     c s     he     e y-generating thought-
c   e   (he uses  he  e m ‘p   ful  b ec ’) ‘c use       es   f  he sub ec ’s c p c   es 
f          l  h ugh    d c mmu  c       eg  d  g  he p   ful  b ec ’. (10)  ‘The 
cognitive arrest phase is usually followed by some form of screen behaviour whose 
content is often the opposite from what has just bee  de  ed. A    d   du l’s 
 
44 Heinrich Wo lfflin, Italien und das Deutsche Formgefühl, Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1931, 1. 
45 He  y K ys  l, ‘Affec   egul        d N  c ss sm. T  um  Ale   hm  ,   d Psych s m   c  ll ess    
   c ss s  c P   e  s,’    Ronningstam, Disorders, 299-325, 315. 
46 Virgil Zeigler-H ll, Sumee  Ch dh     dsey Os e m  : ‘Psych l g c l defe se   d self es eem 
instability: Is defense style associated with unstable self-es eem?’ Journal of Research in Personality, 42:2, 
2008, 348-364. In another interesting study Phebe Cramer compared the use of denial, IQ and ego 
development and found out that high levels of ego development were associated with high intelligence 
and low use of denial or with low intelligence and high use of denial—whereas low levels of ego 
development were associated with high intelligence and high use of denial, or with low intelligence 
and low use of denial. At average levels of IQ, denial was unrelated to ego development. Phebe 
C  me  ‘Eg  Fu c    s   d Eg  De el pment: Defense Mechanisms and Intelligence as Predicators of 
Eg   e el’, Journal of Personality, 67:5, 1999, 735-760, 754. 
47 C  me , ‘Eg  Fu c    s’, 736. He  y P   he    ughl  ,    h s The Ego and Its Defenses, New York: 
Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1970, 57, def  ed de   l  s ‘  p  m    e   d despe   e u c  sc  us me h d 
 f c p  g w  h   he w se     le  ble c  fl c ,     e y,   d em      l d s  ess   d p   ’. The use  f 
denial is opposition to the vital ego functions of perception and memory, it becomes less available as 
 he eg  m  u es   d   s  pe       ‘ s l  ely    ge e  l    be       e se            e’s le el  f em      l 
m  u   y’. (57) See  ls  C  me  ‘Eg  Fu c    s’ f      e pe  me   l c  f  m       f  h s   ew. 
48 Theodore Dorpat, Denial and Defense in Therapeutic Situation, Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1985, 1. 
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unconscious disavowal of his or her weakness, for example, may be followed and 
supp   ed by   b  s ful  sse       f s  e g h’. (13) The sub ec   hus s    es ‘   
substitute a wished-for relation for the painful object relation destroyed in fantasy 
du   g  he    ecede   c g     e    es  ph se’. (14) 
The ‘u ple su  ble  h ugh ’ f   Ge m   sch l  s     he c se  f  he    l    
 e   ss  ce w s  he  ec g        f s me  e else’s,       e’s  w ,  ch e eme  . 
Envy is one of the major manifestations of self-esteem disturbances and one of 
d  g  s  c c   e    f      c ss s  c pe s   l  y d s  de .     ccu s whe    pe s  ’s 
self-esteem is threatened by someone who is perceived as better, which results in 
narcissistic humiliation and decreased self-esteem.49 The manoeuvres to overcome 
 he s  u        clude d m   sh  g   he s’  cc mpl shme  s    self-aggrandizing 
oneself. (38) In the reactions of German scholarship to the Renaissance, one finds 
examples of both reactions—in the form of the denial of the Renaissance and its 
significance or in the form of the claim that it was a German achievement. The 
 e c    s cl sely f ll w D  p  ’s desc  p    s  f  u   gh  de   l   d sc ee   g 
behaviour.  
A good example is Spengler, for whom the Renaissance was merely a 
rejection of the Gothic that was limited to Florence; Siena remained Gothic he says, 
Rome baroque, Northern Italy was Gothic with Byzantine elements. (300-303). In his 
view, Renaissance has purely the character of an anti-movement; it lacks true depth, 
both in the sense of the idea and in the sense of appearance. (300, 350) It never 
brought about a new architectural idea.50 The f  ze   c dem sm  f P ll d  ’s 
architecture one can look upon today only with scepticism (41), he says, while 
P ll d  ’s   chitectural treatise (i.e. one of the most published architecture books in 
history) did not have any impact. (534) This series of straightforward denials does 
not prevent Spengler from engaging in screening behaviour in the form of the 
Germanic appropriation of the Renaissance. He asserts that the Renaissance 
produced no great personalities between Dante and Michelangelo (300) but then 
proceeds with the claim that Filippino Lippi, Ghirlandaio, Botticelli and even 
Leonardo are more Dutch (i.e. Germanic) than ancient,51 and that early Florentine 
p      g  s well  s Albe   ’s   d   u ellesch ’s d sc  e y  f pe spec   e bel  g    
Northern art. (308, 310) Similarly, for Strzygowski, the humanist worldview that 
derives from the Renaissance is a superstition equivalent to the belief that Earth is 
the centre of the Universe.52 The Northern, Gothic, strength of form was misdirected 
by the Renaissance into scientific studies.53 In his view, it is a mistake to attribute to 
Italy and the Mediterranean a strong talent for form.54 ‘  me  e e   ch e ed 
  y h  g’, S  zyg ws   s ys, ‘    e e   he    l   s  f  he  e   ss  ce. They me ely 
cl ss f ed   d sc e   f c lly   g   sed  he f  ms  h   we e b  ugh  f  m  he N   h’. 
(277) At the same time, appropriation comes in the form of the claims that 
 
49 Ronningstam, Identifying, 38 and 89-91. 
50 ‘E    eue    uged   e  s   ch  he    ge  e e ’. Spe gle , Untergang, 303. 
51 Spengler, Untergang, 304. 
52 Josef Strzygowski, Die Krisis Der Geisteswissenschaften, Vienna: Kunstverlag Anton Schroll, 1923, 2. 
53 Strzygowski, Krisis, 198. Similarly in Strzygowski, Europas Machtkunst, 233. 
54 Strzygowski, Machtkunst, 277. 
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Michelangelo was a man of the North and so were Leonardo, Giorgione and 
Raphael.55 Contradictory views of this kind—that the Renaissance did not happen or 
that its art was worthless, while at the same time it was a great achievement of the 
Germanic race—c     ly be e pl   ed f ll w  g D  p  ’s m del    wh ch  u   gh  
denial is accompanied by screening behaviour.  
There are also cases of pure screening behaviour, appropriation pure and 
simple. H  s Sedlm y ’s p  p s l     edef  e  he  e   ss  ce so that it could 
include Goethe can only be understood as such a desperate self-aggrandization 
manoeuvre.56 Acc  d  g    H  s J   ze ,  he    el y  f G     ’s s yle c me f  m 
copying Gothic precedents.57 A particularly comprehensive project of the Germanic 
appropriation of the Italian Renaissance was presented by Ludwig Woltmann in his 
1905 book Die Germanen und die Renaissance.58 According to Woltmann, the presence 
of the Nordic race directly determines the cultural value of a certain population. The 
implication is that there must have been very little Latin or Etruscan blood in 
Italians by the time of the Renaissance. In order to prove this he embarks on 
extensive reconstructions of the Germanic origins of the names of famous Italians 
and asserts that the names of Dante Alighieri, Leon Battista Alberti, Arnolfo di 
Cambio, Filippo Brunelleschi, Donato Bramante, Michelangelo Buonarotti and 
Lorenzo Ghiberti are of Germanic origin.59 His list of popes who allegedly had 
Germanic names takes a whole page. (38-39) Other prominent Italians, who did not 
have Germanic names were nevertheless said to have been blond, as we learn about 
Andrea Palladio, Michelozzo Michelozzi and Luca della Robbia. (71, 76)  
Historiographical fantasies of this kind also illustrate what is described as 
 he ‘e pe s  e c g     e s yle’  h    s ch   c e  s  c  f    c ss s  c pe s   l  y 
structure.60 Expansive cognitive style is nondelusional, but nevertheless minimally 
constrained with reality; it takes liberties with facts in order to redeem self-illusion. 
(78, 84)     s m   ed by ‘u d sc pl  ed  m g        p e ccup ed w  h self-glorifying 
f    s es’  h      es ‘l be   es w  h f c s, embell sh  g  hem   d e e  ly  g    
redeem their illusions about their self-w   h’. (84) A p    cul  ly g  d e  mple—
because of his huge stature as a historian—is the father of the Germanic 
appropriation of the Italian Renaissance, Leopold Ranke himself. As the Nazi 
historian Heinrich Ritter von Srbik stated in full seriousness, it was Ranke who 
described how Germanic and Romanic nations during the Renaissance shared the 
s me le el  f cul u  l de el pme   (   h  g less  h   ‘gle chge   e e Kul u h  he’) 
and their joint cultural achievements in various fields, including artistic creativity.61 
 
55 Strzygowski, Nordseele, f    chel  gel  see  he ch p e  ‘  chel  gel   ls N  dme sch’, 143-177; for 
other artists 374. 
56 H  s Sedlm y , ‘Zu   e  s    de   e   ss  ce’,    Sedlm y , Epochen und Werke, Vienna: Ma  ander, 
1977, 202-234 
57 J   ze , H  s: ‘G      u d d s G   sche S  ll,’ Das Werk des Kunstlers, 5-6 (1939), 441-454. 
58 Ludwig Woltmann, Die Germanen und die Renaissance, Leipzig: Thüringische Verlagsanstalt, 1905. 
59 Woltmann, Germanen, 69, 70, 72, 117. 
60 See in particular The d  e  ll  , ‘DS     c ss s  c Pe s   l  y D s  de . Historical Reflections and 
Fu u e D  ec    s’          gs  m, ed., Disorders, 75-101, 78, 84 and 86. 
61 ‘E  e  E  he   m      u h f e  u d ge s  ge  Ve w  d sch f , gle chge   e e  Kul u h  he und 
Rechtsordnung, gemenischaflichen Unternehmungen ... gleichgearteten staatlichen und 
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The c  e  hes s  f     e’s Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Vo lker von 
1494-1514 is that there exists deep unity of Romance and Germanic nations that 
separates them from Slavic, Latvian and Hungarian ethnic groups, even when they 
share the same Latin Christianity.62 The claim is particularly hard to justify: during 
the pe   d     e’s b    desc  bes the Hungarians, for instance, certainly had more 
interaction with Italy than the Danes; it is unclear how one can measure the nature 
of unity between different nations nor how to justify the claim that, for instance, the 
Germans are somehow more similar to the Portuguese than the Czechs. In order to 
defend his claim, Ranke comes up with a series of remarkable claims that he 
certainly knew to be false. He thus claims that during the period he is writing about 
Slavic and Hungarian nations did not exercise independent influence. (10) But this 
is simply not true; in the given period, Poland, Bohemia and Hungary were ruled by 
the Jagiellonian dynasty whose kings certainly were independent. He also claims 
 h     ly Ge m   c   d   m  ce       s p    c p  ed     he ‘ de   f w  ld 
d sc  e y’.63 The claim may appear plausible merely because only Romance and 
Germanic nations have access to the Atlantic: one cannot expect landlocked 
countries such as Hungary or Bohemia to embark on maritime explorations. But it is 
nevertheless false: Russians certa  ly p    c p  ed     he ‘ de   f w  ld d sc  e y’ 
through their centuries long systematic exploration of Siberia. Their first expeditions 
crossed Siberia and reached the Pacific in 1639 and Alaska in 1732. Ranke also 
asserts that only Romance and Germanic nations had heavily armoured knights—
again a claim that he must have known to be wrong: heavily armoured Serbian 
knights fought against Timur in the battle of Ankara in 1402; famously, the 
Hungarian king Louis II Jagiellon fell from his horse and drowned in a river during 
the battle of Mohacs in 1526 because of his heavy armour.64 The tombstones of 
Hungarian aristocrats often show them in knightly armour.65 But the most bizarre of 
 ll     e’s   gume  s  s  he cl  m  h     ly   m  ce   d Ge m   c       s 
developed cities. (14) It is impossible to conceive how this absurd claim came 
about—and, even more remarkably, in the very next sentence Ranke actually talks 
about Moscow, which is arguably a city and certainly not a Germanic or Romance 
one.  
It is fair to wonder what may have gone wrong if a series of such bizarre 
claims comes from a historian well-known for his scrupulous dedication to facts, a 
                                                                                                                                                             
geselschaftlichen Institutionen und gemeinsamen geistigen Scho  pfungen (... ku s le  sches Sch ffe )’ 
Srbik, Geist und Geeschichte, vol. 1, 244.  
62 Leopold von Ranke, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Vo  lker von 1494-1514, Hamburg: 
Standard Verlag 1957. 
63 F   ‘d e  dee de  Wel e dec u g’ he s ys  h      w uld be u  ecess  y ‘d e Te l  hme u se e  
Vo  l e     d ese  D  ge  … zu e  w c el ; u    ttig weila  ufig zu beweisein, daß sie ihnen 
 uschl eße d e ge  s  d’,     e, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Vo  lker, 17. 
64 ‘Weder an Rittertum noch an der Entwicklung der Sta  d e h be    de e N     e   e lge  mme ’. 
Ranke, Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Vo  lker, 14. The next sentence explains that under 
Rittertum he spec f c lly me  s  he use  f he  y   m u : ‘Noch im Jahr 1501 baten die Russen zu 
Moskau, ihnen einen Ritter, einen eisernen Mann, wie sie sagten zu senden; und staunten ihn als ein 
Wu de    ’. Ibid., 14. 
65 I am indebted to Dora Sallay for showing me a particularly fine collection of the photographs of these 
tombstones collected by Gergely Buzas. 
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sch l   wh  decl  es     he      duc        h s b     h   h s   m  s    desc  be ‘h w 
 h  gs we e’.    d es     help to say merely that his anti-Slavic sentiments broke 
 h  ugh,  h   h s    e      w s    c  s  uc  Sl  s  s ‘ he   he ’  f Eu  pe   
historiography. True, in the same book he praised the extermination [ausrotten] of 
the Slavic population west of the Odra as   ‘g e    ch e eme  ’ [gla nzender Erfolg], 
but this does not explain his need to assert the unity of Germanic and Romance 
nations.66 The motivation becomes clear only when Ranke says that in the period the 
book describes, the Italians developed their intellectual achievement to a level of 
perfection which to Germanic-Romance nations has ever since appeared to be the 
highest state of civilization [Bildung] that they have achieved.67 The p    u  ‘ hey’ 
explains everything: it suddenly makes the Italian Renaissance a German 
achievement as well. 
 
Inconceivability 
 
Haughtiness—disdain for others—another important characteristic of narcissistic 
pe s   l  y s  uc u e, c   be see      he   m    c w  ld  ew’s cl ss f c    y ze l 
  d  he c    c      h     d   du ls’ intellectual (in)capacities can be established as 
inferior to those of the historian by a simple classificatory act, purely on the basis of 
 hese   d   du ls’ p    c p          he   c mmu   y. The  c   f cl ss f c      e  bles 
a historian to assume a position exalted above historical figures, whose mental, 
intellectual and creative capacities are said to be determined by their collective. 
  s f    s cl  ms  b u    d   du ls’   c p c   es   e b sed      b     y 
generalisation, this is a methodological error that can only be explained by the 
f    sy  b u    e’s  w  supe      y:  he h s        s s y  g  h    he membe s  f   
specific collective are deprived of specific intellectual capacities that he or she has 
(or could have).68 Contextualisation, which is a necessary tool of historical research 
thus becomes an occasion to manufacture gratification in the form of a self-
aggrandizing narrative. We have thus seen, for instance, how Panofsky attributed to 
Polygnotus the incapacity to conceive of naturalistic landscape  s well  s P  de ’s 
cl  ms  b u   he    b l   es  f       s p    e s   d     e’s b z   e cl  ms  b u  
the incapacities of non-Germanic and non-  m  ce       s. S m l  ly,    Spe gle ’s 
Decline of the West one reads—bes des  he cl  ms  b u   uss   s’   capacities cited 
above— h     ‘ e l’ A  b c      g  sp  he C pe   c   sys em (31)  s well  s  h   
ancient Greek or Roman historians were unable to conceive of writing about more 
distant past but only about contemporary events. (13)  
 
66 ‘Gl  ze de  E f lg’.     e, Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Vo  lker, 12. 
67 ‘…ihre geistige Kraft zu einer Vollendung zu entwickelten, welche den germanisch-romanischen 
N     e   mme   ls e  e höchs e S ufe   ldu g e sch e e   s , d e s e b s  e z  e  e ch  h be ’. Ranke, 
Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Vo  lker, 105. Note  he ph  se ‘d e s e’ that expresses 
approiation. 
68 C  s de    ce  g    P  de ’s cl  m  h     ly   Eu  pe  ,   d            c   p     l  e G ugu  . 
Pinder himself cannot paint like Gauguin, but he is a European, therefore he is suggesting that in some 
circumstances he still should be able to do it, while a Maori is supposed to be constitutionally deprived 
of this possibility. 
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Since arbitrary generalisations of this kind cannot be methodologically 
justified, it is important to consider the extra-theoretical motivation to generate 
them. In psychological literature such arbitrary assertions (prejudiced evaluations of 
others based on their membership of specific groups) are called stereotyping. In the 
context of historical research, these are crude methodological errors—but they 
become explainable if one takes into account the body of psychological research that 
relates expression of prejudices to self-esteem maintenance. Three psychological 
experiments carried out by Steven Fein and Steven Spencer are particularly 
interesting in this sense.69 In one study they tested subjects, divided in two groups, 
for prejudices against homosexuals. The two groups were statistically equivalent 
and one could have expected to receive the same average responses from both 
groups. The subjects in the first (control) group showed little or no bias on average. 
The subjects in the second group were given a bogus and unfair IQ test in which 
they received disappointing results before being tested for their prejudices. As it 
 u  ed  u ,  hese sub ec s’  esp  ses     he sec  d  es  sh wed   s g  f c    le el  f 
prejudice.70 
In another study, the same authors examined how self-esteem regulation 
affects prejudices against members of an ethnic group. This time too, the 
participants in the experiment were divided into two groups. One (control) group 
clearly showed ethnic prejudices. The members of the other group underwent a 
‘self-affirmati   p  cedu e’ bef  e  es   g. Th s  s    es  bl shed p  cedu e    
psychology; the participants were given a series of values (business, art, social life) 
and asked to circle one value that was most important to them personally and 
comment on it. After this self-affirmation procedure, this group manifested almost 
no prejudice in the stereotyping test. The conclusion is that opportunities for self-
affirmation can reduce the likelihood that individuals will derogate members of 
stereotyped groups. 
In the third study all participants were given a bogus IQ test and after 
receiving a randomly generated score (in some cases low, in others high; they 
thought the test was genuine) they completed a questionnaire that measured their 
self-esteem. As expected, those participants who received low scores on the bogus 
IQ test scored low on the self-esteem test as well. When they were subsequently 
tested for their ethnic prejudices, such participants scored much higher than those 
participants who received good scores on the bogus IQ test. After this, self esteem 
was measured once again and it turned out that it improved substantially in the 
case of those participants who originally had a low score on the self-esteem test and 
were given the chance to pass a negative judgment on the stereotyped target (ethnic 
minority) in the second test. The remarkable result is that negatively evaluating 
 
69 S e e  Fe     d S e e  Spe ce , ‘P e ud ce  s Self-Image maintenance: Affirming the Self Through 
De  g    g O he s’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73:1, 1997, 31-44. 
70 See G mb  ch’s d scuss    s m l   phe  me       el         sch l  ly    e p e      s    E  s  
Gombrich (w  h Pe e   u  e), ‘E  s  G mb  ch d scusses  he c  cep   f cul u  l h s   y w  h Pe e  
 u  e’, The Listener, 27th December, Vol. 90, 1973, pp.881-883. 
http://gombricharchive.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/showdoc19.pdf accessed on 12 November, 2013. 
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others has the potential to restore a positive self-image. Stereotyping is thus one of 
several possible self-image-maintenance strategies.   
It is very difficult to find an alternative explanation for (and the reception of) 
the scholarly claims based on stereotyping that have been described previously in 
 h s     cle. Fe  ’s   d Spe ce ’s e pe  me  s p ese      e s   ble e pl        whe  
no reasons that led scholars to adopt stereotyping beliefs can be stated, or reasons 
that can be stated are systematically fallacious in the stereotyping direction. A good 
e  mple  s E w   P   fs y’s cl  m  h   pe spec   e c uld     h  e bee  d sc  e ed 
before the early Renaissance because space was not yet conceived as homogenous.71 
The thesis had an exceptionally wide reception in twentieth century scholarship; its 
obvious implication is the claim that before the Renaissance (or in non-’Wes e  ’ 
cultures) people were constitutionally incapable of comprehending perspectival 
drawings.72 Panofsky supported the thesis by asserting, on the basis of a section in 
Eucl d’s Optics, that Greek vision was substantially different from modern vision. 
He also claimed that seeing things in perspective is a product of early Renaissance 
cultural developments: the ability to comprehend perspectival representations 
cannot be a natural trait of human vision since the geometrical construction of 
perspectival drawings is defined for a flat plane whereas the surface of the retina is 
curved. All three arguments are fallacious. Considering the definition of 
homogeneity (that Panofsky took from Cassirer) the thesis that space was not 
conceived of as homogenous before the early Renaissance is absurd, since it 
suggests that before that time people could not figure out that distance between 
points A and B must be the same as between B and A—that, for instance, the length 
of a wall is the same regardless from which end one measures it.73 P   fs y’s claim 
 h     c e   G ee s’   s    w s d ffe e  ly   g   sed f  m m de    el ed      
m su de s   d  g  f  he  ech  c l  e m   l gy  f  he G ee     g   l  f Eucl d’s 
Optics.74 As for the curvature of the retina, we do not see the retinal image but a 
perspectival drawing, and such drawings are geometrically constructed to deliver to 
the eye a bundle of light rays equivalent to the one that would reach the eye from 
 
71 E w   P   fs y, ‘D e Pe spe    e  ls ‘symb l sche F  m’,    Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 1924–
1925, Fritz Saxl, ed., Leipzig: Taubner, 1927.  
72 The idea has been subsequently defended by Samuel Edgerton, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear 
Perspective, New York: Basic Books, 1975, 161; Peter Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture 1750-
1950, London: Faber and Faber, 1965, 285 and James Elkins, The Poetics of Perspective, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994, 24. A more radical version of the argument is the one by Hubert Damisch who 
argued that Brunelleschi discovered the geometrical construction of perspective without relying on the 
concept of homogenous space (The Origin of Perspective, English translation by John Goodman, 
Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1995, 154) and Alberto Pérez-Gómez and Louise Pelletier, who 
argued that the homogeneity of space became conceivable only in the eighteenth century (Architectural 
Representation and the Perspective Hinge Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997, 21, 26, 98). For a survey 
of this deb  e see               , ‘ e        s   Albe      d  he H m ge e  y  f Sp ce’, Journal of the 
Society of Architectural Historians, 63:4, 2004, 424-439. 
73 See        , ‘Albe      d H m ge e  y’. 
74 The c uc  l  efu        f P   fs y’s    e p e        f Euclid is in C. D. Brownson, ‘Eucl d’s Optics 
  d   s C mp   b l  y w  h    e   Pe spec   e’, Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 26:1, 1982, 165-193. 
See  ls  W. K    , ‘O   he p   c ple  f l  e   pe spec   e    Eucl d’s Optics’, Centaurus, 34, June-
December 1991, 193-210   d   ch  d T b  , ‘A c e   pe spec   e   d Eucl d’s Optics’, Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 53, 1990, 14-41. 
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the object represented by the drawing. While it is not unusual that scholars make 
mistakes like these, it has to be recognised that all three errors were made in order 
to support a stereotyping claim about the incapacity of pre-quattrocento   d ‘   -
Wes e  ’ c llec   es    c mp ehe d pe spec    l d  w  gs.  de   ‘Wes e  e s’ 
supposedly have this capacity that others do not have. Panofsky made no errors in 
the opposite direction. It is also interesting to think that at the time these claims 
we e m de,  he e we e ple  y  f sch l  s wh  c uld h  e  e l sed  h   P   fs y’s 
arguments were fallacious, but rebuttals were made only many decades later—a 
phenomenon that can only be explained by assuming that many scholars wanted to 
believe that Panofsky was right. 75  
   
Free will 
 
S e e  yp  g cl ss f c    y ze l    h s   y w     g  hus  e e ls  he h s      ’s f    sy 
about his or her own grandiosity. Historical figures are assumed to be predictable 
and their reasoning capacities explainable using classification into ethnic, cultural or 
historical contexts. Self-esteem maintenance efforts of this kind must result in the 
dismissal of those positions that would disable such a strategy. This pertains 
particularly to those positions that would allow the historical figures (or anyone else, 
for that matter) to have reasoning capacities equivalent to those of the historian. An 
e  mple  f  h s  s  he   m    c    d     ’s  e ec      f (  d   e c uld s me  mes 
say the rage caused by) the idea of cosmopolitanism. This rejection may seem 
bizarre if one does not understand it as directed against the idea that understanding 
individuals from other contexts has to be an understanding of them as humans with 
 e s    g c p c   es equ   le        e’s  w . Al e dy He de   e ected cosmopolitan 
views because of their association with the Enlightenment.76 Julius Langbehn 
d sm ssed  ess  g’s c sm p l     sm; K  l   mp ech   ep   ched     e f    he 
same reason; Spengler thought that the cosmopolitan worldview is a product of 
ultimate u b   dec de ce; H  s Sedlm y   de   f ed    w  h  he ‘ e      f  e s  ’; 
W lhelm P  de  c    c zed    e ee  h ce  u y ‘m d ess  f     less ess’.77 Erich 
 
75 As for the argument about the curvature of the retina, I am unaware of refutations published before 
 he 1960s.    w s  ’s     cle ‘Eucl d’s Optics’  h   p    ed  u   h   P   fs y m su de s   d Eucl d’s 
Optics came out only in 1982 while the refutation of the view that homogenous space was 
inconceivable before the Renaissance came out in 2004. 
76 For Herder see Brian Whitton, ‘Herder's Critique of the Enlightenment: Cultural Community versus 
C sm p l            l sm’, History and Theory, 27:1, 1988, 146-168, 154-155. 
77 Julius Langbehn, Rembrandt als Erzieher, Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1936., 246-247. Karl Lamprecht, 
‘Al e u d  eue   ch u ge     Ge s esw sse sch f ,’    K  l   mp ech , Alternative zu Ranke, Lothar 
Reher (ed.) Leipzig: Reclam, 1988. 143-207, 166. Spengler saw in cosmopolitanism hatred of destiny; the 
Weltbürger and dreamer of eternal piece are spiritual leaders of Fellachentum, the ultimate phase of 
civilizational decline. (Untergang, 780) Sedlmayr, in his Verlust der Mitte, Salzburg: Otto Mu  ller, 1948, 
d scussed V ud ye ’s p   ec   f   sphe  c l h use f     c sm p l  e: ‘U d  n der Tat, wie ko  nnte der 
‘K sm p l  ’, de  he m  - und bodenlose Zukunftsmensch, anders hausen als in der Bodenlosigkeit 
des Kugelhauses, dessen Tyrannei er sich—Anbeter der geometrischen Vernunft—freiwillig 
u  e w  f ’. (99) F     ge e  l d scuss     f the phenomenon, see Kurt Flasch, Die geistige 
Mobilmachung. Die deutschen intellektuellen und der Erste Weltkrieg, Berlin: Alexander Fest Verlag, 2000, 
275. Wilhelm Pinder, Von den Künsten und der Kunst, Munich: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1948, 37. See 
similarly h s c    que  f m de   ‘   ellec u l empl yees w  h u     g  ,           h s   y,’ W lhelm 
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Rothacker saw in the understanding of humans as individuals a product of the 
d ss lu      f ‘  g   c’ communities which cease to be understood as based on 
blood and faith.78  
The major metaphysical implication of a self-aggrandizing strategy based on 
classifying individuals away into collectives they belong to must be the denial of the 
free will of historical subjects. If human intellectual life and the ideas individuals 
have are predetermined by their social-historical context, then one cannot say that 
these individuals have free will to decide about their actions. In that case, 
individuals simply could not think to act differently. There is no deciding without 
thinking, and saying that all thinking is predetermined by the group means saying 
that all acting is predetermined as well. Even admitting that free will is an 
irresolvable metaphysical problem makes the Romantic position unsustainable. But 
the possession of free will is an irresolvable metaphysical problem. The main thesis 
of the Romantic worldview thus cannot be asserted without making a major 
metaphysical claim that its proponents cannot (and would have known that they 
cannot) back up. Insofar as they did assert it, they could have only done so 
motivated by extra-theoretical reasons. The denial of the free will of historical 
figures relegates them into the ranks of predictable creatures whose acting is 
determined and can be described by the historian from his or her elevated position.  
In the case of Panofsky, the adoption of the assumption of free will of 
historical figures signalled his break with (and his main argument against) the 
Romantic worldview.79 Those historians who tried to combine free will and the 
Romantic worldview systematically ran into difficulties. Ernst Troeltsch insisted 
that historical entities such as nations, states and epochs cannot be reduced to the 
sums of individual biographical humans, that they are to be studied on their own 
and that they possess their own originality and creativity.80 At the same time, he 
wanted to attribute free will to individual humans and he admitted that its 
implication is the impossibility of any kind of general laws in history. (51) But if this 
is so, then it becomes impossible to talk about the general character of collective 
historical entities, such as nations, states or epochs, or to study them on their own, 
the way Troeltsch wanted to, because their members have free will that may change, 
at any time, the general character of the entity. More exactly, such entities cannot 
have a character of  he    w ;  he ‘ch   c e ’  h    hey m   fes   esul s f  m 
interactions between the free wills of their participants. Similarly, Johann Gustav 
Droysen insisted that an individual is born into the situation of his nation, language 
and religion and that an individual human is a manifestation and mere example of 
his collective.81 He too wanted to combine this view with the assumption of human 
free will. (24) However, if they have free will, humans can opt not to act as one 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pinder, Gesammelte Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1907-1935, Leo Bruhns ed., Leipzig: Verlag E. A. Seemann, 
1938, 50. 
78 Erich Rothacker, Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften, Bonn: Bouvier, 1948, 76-77. 
79 See               , ‘Hum   s  A   H s   y   d   s E em es. E w   P   fs y     he   d   du l sm-
C llec    sm deb  e’, Konsthistorisk Tidskrift, 78:1, 2009, 57-76. 
80 Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme, 33-38. 
81 Johann Gustav Droysen: Historik. Text Ausgabe von Peter Leyh. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977, 
14, 28. 
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would expect in accordance with their collective membership, or if they do, this is 
not going to be because they are mere examples of the members of their groups, but 
because they have decided to act in a certain way. Droysen indeed comes to 
recognise the incompatibility of the two views, and in order to save the situation, he 
ch  ges  he me    g  f  he  e m ‘f ee w ll’. He s   es  h   h s    c l determination is 
not opposed to free will the way water is not opposed to virtue; the real opposite of 
f ee w ll  s c e c   , he s ys. Thus u de s   d, h we e , ‘f ee w ll’ me ely me  s 
the absence of social coercion, and does not pertain to the capacity to make 
dec s   s  b u    e’s  w   c    s—which is a different concept from the free will 
that he originally wanted to attribute to historical figures.  
In both Troeltsch and Droysen we thus find attempts at preserving the 
possibility of the fabrication of self-aggrandizing historical narratives combined 
with the efforts to avoid its metaphysical implications. Other proponents of the 
Romantic worldview were more inclined to reject free will. For Spengler destiny, 
Schicksal is the all-determining historical force.82 The discoveries of Oxygen or 
Neptune occurred at a certain moment because they were predestined to occur, he 
says. (156) Similarly, Dagobert Frey rejected free will following Thomas Henry 
 uc le’s   ew  h    he bel ef    f ee w ll w s   me  phys c l dogma, and then strove 
to replace it with racial and ethnic determinism.83 Hans Georg Gadamer rejected free 
will on theological grounds. In his view faith is not an option of the human being 
bu     esul   f G d’s g  ce;84   hum   be  g’s e c u  e  w  h G d  s similar to the 
way a snake and a mongoose look each other in the eye.85 As he describes it, a snake 
  d   m  g  se d       e c     e ch   he ’s  c    s; wh    hey d   s p ede e m  ed 
by the situation. Everything happens instantaneously. There is no free will for 
Gadamer; like a snake or a mongoose, God has no more choice than the human 
being. Of course, Gadamer has no proof that this is so and he knows that he does 
not have it; but such a claim is vital in order to sustain the position that other 
individuals are fully explainable by their historicity, something that in his fantasy 
(as we shall now see) does not apply to himself. 
 
Reflexive argument 
 
The reflexive argument is a well-known counterargument to the Romantic worldview. 
If all human thinking, knowledge and beliefs (together with intellectual life, 
 
82 Spengler, Untergang, 62, 69 and then esp. 152-214. 
83 Dagobert Frey, Kunstwissenschaftliche Grundfragen. Prolegomena zu einer Kunstphilosophie, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgeselschaft, 1992, a reprint of the Vienna: R. M. Rohrer Verlag, 1946, 60. 
84 Hans-Ge  g G d me , ‘Zu  P  blem     des Selbs  e    d  sses,’    H  s Ge  g G d me , 
Erga nzungen, 122-132, 129: ‘Das Selbstversta  ndnis des Glaubens ist ja ganz gewiß dadurch bestmmt, 
daß der Glaube, theologisch gesehen, nicht eine Mo  glichkeit des Menschen ist, sondern eine Gnadentat 
G   es, d e dem Gl ube de  gesch eh ’.  
85 ‘[V          We zs  cker] verdanke ich etwa auch den Hinweis, daß das spannungsvolle Verhalten, 
durch das ein Ichneumon und eine Schlange einander Auge in Auge in Schach halten, sich nicht als 
das jeweilige  Reagieren des einen Partners auf den angriffsversuch des anderen beschreiben la  ßt, 
sondern es ist die einheitliche Gestalt der Bewegung im ganzen, die das Bewegungsverhalten der 
e  zel e     s ch e  f  m ’. G d me , ‘P  blem    ’, 129.   
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creativity and so on) derive from membership of a group, then this must be also the 
case with the view that all thinking, knowledge and beliefs derive from such 
membership as well. The thesis then cannot really be true, and it can only be 
 eg  ded  s ‘  ue’      d f   spec f c c   e  s—e.g. those in which the Romantic 
worldview is dominant. But then the central thesis of the Romantic worldview 
becomes mere fiction in which people believe in some periods of history. The only 
way for a scholar to save the central thesis of the Romantic worldview as true—to 
say that it is not a mere fad of his or her times—is to claim that eve y  e else’s 
thinking is contextually determined except his or her own. Ian Verstegen called this 
s    egy ‘self-e emp   g      ude’. 86 What it de facto  e e ls  s   f    sy  b u    e’s 
own privileged position in world history.87 
H  s Ge  g G d me ’s  esp nse to the reflexive argument is a particularly 
fine illustration of the problem. Hermeneutic and historicist traditions insisted that a 
hum     d   du l’s  h     g  s   p  duc   f h s    he  c   e     d e      me  , 
and that understanding is primarily (or exclusively) a procedure of 
contextualisation. The problem then becomes how to explain the fact that one can 
understand the statements of historical figures at all. On the one hand, the 
h s      ’s u de s   d  g h s    be de e m  ed by h s    he   w  c   ext as well, 
 
86 Ian Verstegen: A Realist Theory of Art History, London: Routledge 2013, 8-10.  
87 Such narcissistic fantasies proliferated in English-speaking scholarship during the final decades of 
 he  we   e h ce  u y. C  s de    s   eme   by El z be h Deeds E m   h, ‘ ey  d H s   y’, Rethinking 
History, 5:2 (2001) 195-216, 196:  
 
individuals do not produce ideas or cultural systems, ideas and systems are there already and 
  d   du ls … ge  b          hem  us   s  hey   e b           l  gu ge   d         e    e se   f 
assumptions about identity, conduct and How Things Work. 
 
By asserting it she is not merely saying that this claim is an assumption that her context makes her 
believe that it is true. She is not saying that she is stating her belief; she is making a claim that has 
certain conditions of satisfaction that would make the proposition true if they were satisfied, and her 
claim is that they are satisfied. But if this were so, then her position would be exempted from historical 
de e m         h    pe   es e e y  e else’s  h     g. He   he  e  c l w     s  b  e e e y  e else’s. O  
c  s de  Ke  h Je    s’ ‘     duc    ’    Ke  h Je    s, ed., The Postmodern History Reader, London: 
Routledge, 1997, 1-35, 17:  
 
The factualist/empiricist idea so rooted in traditional historical thinking, that if we can find 
‘ he f c s’  he   h s w ll s  p    e p e     e flu , f  ls bec use   ly  he  y c   c  s   u e wh   
counts as a fact in the first place.  
 
If we ask what theory ensures that what Keith Jenkins says is a fact, the answer has to be that Keith 
Je    s s ys s . S m l  ly,     y     es   d D   d  l       ‘ el     sm,        l sm   d  he S c  l gy 
 f K  wledge’          H ll s   d S e e   u es, eds, Rationality and Relativism, Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1982, 21-47, 27   gue  h   w  ds ‘  ue’   d ‘f lse’ p    de  he  d  m    wh ch e  lu     s 
  e e p essed   d  he w  ds ‘       l’   d ‘         l’ h  e  he s me fu c    . The   p s       s    
accept that these are mere s   eme  s  f   e’s c   e  -bound preferences—the words are comparable 
    he   c bul  y used by  w  ‘p  m    e’ ( s  hey s y)    bes     udge e ch   he s d ffe e   bel efs. Th s 
claim itself is meaningful only insofar as it states certain conditions of satisfaction whose fulfilment 
makes this proposition true, and Barnes and Bloor are asserting that these conditions as satisfied—
wh ch  mpl es  h   e e y  e else’s s   eme  s   e   ue  el    e     he   c   e  , wh le     es’   d 
 l   ’s s   eme    s   ue    extra-contextual sense.  
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and if that context is different, then understanding would have to be impossible. On 
the other, insofar as understanding is possible, this implies that the historian shares 
with historical authors some common rationality that enables it—in which case it is 
hard to say that this common rationality is not universal rationality, since collective 
rationality would differ from a group to a group. In his Der Aufbau der 
Geschichtlichen Welt Wilhelm Dilthey argued that the meaning of any thought or 
action is in its relation to its historical context.88 The understanding of historical 
individuals is therefore the understanding of the contexts that determine them. (228) 
H we e ,  f  he c   e   de e m  es   d   du ls’  h     g,  he   h s h s    be  he 
case w  h  he h s      ’s  h     g  s well,   d he e       e c          d  he 
p  blem  f e pl     g  he h s      ’s c p c  y    u de s   d d ffe e   c   e  s. 
When he faces the problem, Dilthey suddenly changes his position and states that 
historical understanding relies on what has the character of permanence in time and 
universal human validity.89 Suddenly, and contrary to his central thesis, not all 
aspects of human cognition turn out to be contextually determined; some have 
universal validity. The same problem was resolved by Ernst Troeltsch in his Der 
Historismus und seine Probleme, by referring directly to mystical, occult forces.90 
Individuals, he says, can only be understood in the context of a greater totality such 
as family, class or nation (33) and these totalities have their own shared spirit 
(Gemeingeist) that is constituted by a consciousness that is external to the 
participating individuals. (46) If we then ask how a historian can comprehend 
individuals from other groups in which he or she does not participate, Troeltsch 
  swe s  h    he e pl         f  he h s      ’s p  cedu e bel  gs    me  phys cs 
(71): it is enabled by Total Consciousness (Allbewußtsein) which also explains the 
works of poets and occultist phenomena. (684) Historical understanding is thus 
explained as an action of an extra-human spiritual force.  
It should be noted that these authors are discussing the intellectual capacities 
that enable interpretation, not the reflexive argument itself. Rather, their efforts are 
directed to sustaining a theory of interpretation that allows for the self-gratifying 
stereotyping of authors into their contexts, even at the price of self-contradiction or 
the explanation of the interpretation of text as equivalent to occult phenomena. The 
problem clearly indicates a major irresolvable contradiction in the Romantic 
worldview that should have led to its rejection because no real solution has or could 
have been proposed. The fact that these authors sustain Romantic intellectual 
collectivism, even at the cost of self-contradiction or equating historical 
interpretation to spiritualist phenomena, indicates that they have extra-theoretical 
motivation to do so. At the same time one cannot fail to notice that what they are 
defending is the capacity of historiography to contribute to self-esteem regulation 
through the fabrication of stereotyping narratives.   
 
88 Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
1981, 189. 
89 Dilthey, Aufbau, 196: ‘D e  ed  gu g fu  r diese Interpretation der historischen Reste its, daß das, was 
wir in sie hieintragen, den Charakter der Besta  ndigkeit in der Zeit und der allgemein-menschlichen 
Gel u g h  ’. 
90 Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme. Erstes Buch: Das logische Problem der 
Geschichtsphilosophie, Tu bingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1922. 
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In Gadamer, however, we find a fine example of grandiosity proper. In 
opposition to the views we have just considered, Gadamer insisted on the historicity 
of the historian.91 In his view, every intellectual process, including the mental 
processes of the historian who comprehends the ideas of historical figures, derives 
from the specific historical context they belong to. It is determined by the 
  d   du l’s h   z  . G d me ’s  he  y  f    e p e        s ‘ he fus     f h   z  s’ 
in Wahrheit und Methode was precisely constructed in order to avoid the problem 
that, as we have seen, other authors of the hermeneutic and historicist tradition had 
struggled with. The rub is, however, that here we run into the reflexive argument 
proper: a universal claim about the determination of all cognition by its historical 
context suggests that this claim too has validity only in its own historical context as 
well. And this is something that Gadamer cannot accept. The assertion that all 
cognition is historically relative does not allow one to ask about the historicity of the 
claim that all cognition is historically relative. Such reflexive reasoning, Gadamer 
says, does not invalidate the absolute validity of the thesis about the historicity of all 
knowledge but the validity of formal reasoning.92 In other words, if formal-logical 
   lys s sh ws  h   G d me ’s cl  m  s self-contradictory, then something must be 
wrong with formal-logical re s    g. Such    ‘  gume  ’ c   be used  g   s    y 
self-contradiction: whenever one faces self-contradiction, one can avoid the problem 
by simply declaring logical thinking as not valid and inapplicable. It is remarkable 
 h     ph l s phe   f G d me ’s s ature would allow himself to fall so low as to 
employ this kind of argument. 93 Just as in the case of Ranke, when such a lapse 
happens, we should look for the motivation behind it. Like Ranke, Gadamer says it 
himself. A historian must take into account his or her own historicity, he insists.94 
But this does not apply to the philosopher, who is elevated to a higher, different 
le el: ‘    s   p e ud ce  f  efle   e ph l s phy …  h      u de s   ds  s   
relationship between sentences, what does not belong to the s me le el’.95 In other 
w  ds, G d me ’s  w  cl  m  f u   e s l h s    c  y  f  ll    wledge  s         he 
s me le el  s   he  sch l  s’;   ge he  w  h   s  u h  ,    fl   s  l  f  b  e h s   y    
wh ch e e y  e else’s  h     g  s subme ged. 
Another approach to the reflexive argument is to admit it, but nevertheless 
 sse    he u   e s l de e m         f hum   c g     e c p c   es by  he   d   du l’s 
 
91 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tu bingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1993, 274, 302, 304, 400. 
92 ‘s  de   de  W h he  s  sp uch des f  m le  A gume   e e s u  be h up  [w  d ge   ffe ]’. 
Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 350. 
93 The argument is not better than a ch ld psych l g s ’s    e   ew w  h   f u -year old:  
E: Should boys get more? Why should they get more? 
Ben: Because they always need more. 
E. Why do they need more? 
 e :  ec use  h  ’s h w   w      . 
( ep   ed    D ew Wes   , ‘The  el     s Am  g N  c ss sm, Eg ce    sm, Self-Concept and Self-
Es eem: E pe  me   l, Cl   c l   d The  e  c l C  s de      s’, Psychoanalysis and Contemporary 
Thought, 13:2, 1992, 183-239, 200.)  
94 ‘H s    sches  ewuß se   ... muß    W h he   d e e ge e Gesch ch l ch e   m  de  e ’. G d me , 
Wahrheit und Methode, 366. 
95 ‘Es geh  rt zu den Vorurteilen der Reflexionsphilosophie, daß sie als ein Verha  ltnis von Sa  tzen 
versteht, was gar nicht auf der gleichen logischen Ebene lieg ’. G d me , Wahrheit und Methode, 452. 
                Romantic worldview as a narcissistic construct 
 
 
 24 
membership of a group. In this case, the author admits that he or she is 
predetermined to think that all thinking results from membership of a group. This 
w s Spe gle ’s s    egy. ‘A  h   e   s   m  ’, he s ys   l   g  b u  h mself  s  he 
 u h    f h s b   , ‘wh  h s bee  p edes   ed     ep ese    he   me  h  ugh h s 
own observing and understanding. He has no choice. He thinks the way he has to 
 h   ,   d wh    s   ue f   h m  s  he p c u e  f  he w  ld  h   w s b    w  h h m’.96 
However, this approach avoids the problems with the reflexive argument only 
provisionally. It still wants to be true: Spengler still wants to say that the processes 
within cultures that he describes truly determine historical events and intellectual 
lives. Otherwise he would be admitting that his philosophy of history is in no way 
different from a narration that describes drug-induced hallucinations—whereby his 
drug is the historical context. Consequently, insofar as he wants his philosophy of 
history to mean what he is saying—that human thinking is a mere manifestation of 
its cultural context—he has to assert that his position in his culture has a privileged 
world-historical status that enables him this insight. When he says that his views are 
historically predetermined and still assumes that they are true, the implications is 
that he is historically predetermined to be right.97    
 
 
Concluding rumination 
 
The   ew  h     hum   be  g’s c g     e  b l   es   d   lues   e de e m  ed by h s 
or her membership of a collective was the core thesis of Romanticism in its original, 
late-eighteenth century articulation. Since those days, up to the postmodernist social 
constructivism of the late 1900s, the Romantic tradition has passed through many 
phases and metamorphoses. The debate about the nature of the determining 
collective has split it into the left and right wing, the former emphasizing class 
determination, the latter ethnic and racial determination. But the core idea, that 
human being has neither nature nor identity beyond that which is bestowed by the 
community, has remained unchanged—indeed, it would be hard to find an idea that 
defines and individuates the Romantic tradition in a more fundamental way.  
This core thesis relies on assumptions that are not only dubious, but can only 
be understood if one takes into account the motivation that led to its articulation in 
the first place. A historian who assumes that historical figures had different 
rationality than his or her own will never be able to understand their beliefs—and 
since beliefs based on a different rationality cannot be grasped nor even registered, 
one cannot actually know that an alternative rationality was operational some time 
in the past.98 The central thesis of the Romantic worldview also implies the rejection 
 
96 Spengler, Untergang, vii. 
97 In other words: sentences have certain conditions of satisfaction and are true if these conditions are 
s   sf ed. The c  d       f s   sf c      f ‘All  h     g  s h s    c lly de e m  ed’  s  h    ll  h     g  s 
historically determined, and this sentence is true if this condition if fulfilled. Spengler claims that it is 
true and that, consequently the condition is fulfilled, which boils down to saying that he was 
historically predetermined to have proclaim this truth.   
98 C  s de        J y’s cl  m    h s “H s    c l e pl          d  he e e  ” New Literary History, 42:4, 
(2011) 557-571, 561: ‘su ely,  he e  s    self-evident transcendental version of rationality that can be 
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of free will, which involves serious metaphysical claims that have never been (could 
not have been) properly resolved by its proponents. The idea that human thinking is 
a product of its context fails to deal with the reflexive argument and ends up in a 
paradox. For any rational thinker these reasons should be enough to reject the 
thesis—and if thesis is not rejected, while no successful response is provided against 
these objections, then one must look for extra-rational motivation to uphold it. 
While human rational beliefs, decisions and actions do not require additional 
explanation other than rationality itself, irrationality is a sign that some other 
motivation or weakness has been in action. Because of the elusive nature of art, art 
historiography is a particularly convenient field to study the irrationalities of the 
Romantic worldview—few other fields provide its protagonists with so much 
freedom to make the claims that they want to make. The scholarship of the era 1890 
through 1950 is conveniently remote from the original Romanticism of the late 
eighteenth century and yet rich in the examples that enable the study it as a 
worldview. It transpires that the irrationalities manifested in scholarship of the era 
  e        d m bu  u  f  m. They c  s s e  ly   d c  e  he  mpl c   f   h      e’s 
own grandiosity and reveal the use scholarship for the purposes of self-esteem 
management. More generally, the analysis shows that if one disregards the 
p    g   s s’    es me  s    self-esteem regulation the Romantic worldview 
dissolves into a set of random arbitrary self-contradictions.  
Unbalanced self-esteem can thus play havoc with attempts to make 
historiography wissenschaftlich. It is also interesting to think about its impact on the 
reception of scholarly works. A good example is the long-term failure of the scholarly 
c mmu   y     ec g  se  he f ll c es P   fs y’s  hes s  b u  perspective, a 
phenomenon that can be only explained by suppression, understood as the 
unwillingness to pay attention to the weaknesses of the thesis. Books, after all, 
become influential because they say what people want to hear. If a scholarly work 
enjoys particularly good reception in a certain community in spite of its absurd 
character, while it argues positions that are favourable to the self-esteem of the 
members of the community, then it is reasonable to assume that such contribution to 
self-esteem contributes to its good reception. Scholarship does not exist outside its 
social context, while this context is largely constructed by the self-esteem problems 
of the individuals that make it up. From everything one knows about the German 
intelligentsia of the 1920s,  he  bsu d ch   c e   f Spe gle ’s Untergang des 
Abendlandes must have been obvious to its readers. Nevertheless, the book was an 
e   m us success. S m l  ly, S  zyg ws  ’s b z   e  he   es we e p  mulg  ed    
the 1930s by the Nazi propaganda machine—and since every propaganda wants to 
be credible, the fact that his writings were endorsed by the propagandist apparatus 
indicates that the apparatus expected them to meet appropriate reception. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
 ppl ed h s    c lly   d  c  ss cul u es u de   ll c  cums   ces’.     s    e es   g     h    h w J y c   
know that there ever existed a rationality different than his own. Certainly, if there ever existed a 
cultural context in which, for instance, the principle of non-contradiction did not apply, since Jay could 
not grasp beliefs of people from that context, he could not register them as different from his own in 
the sense of their rationality. So he cannot really know, or make a justified claim, that a different 
rationality in this sense was ever historically operational.  
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reception of a book always says much about the context of its reception. In another 
c   e      es eemed p  fess   eme   us f  m Eu  pe’s (  gu bly,     he   me) m s  
prestigious art history department would be hospitalized for claiming that 
Michelangelo was a Viking. People would think that he needs help. It says much 
about the context in which Strzygowski lived, that such claims merely brought him 
favourable publicity.  
The study of denials in intellectual history thus promises to provide wider 
insights into social forces that move human societies outside the world of intellect. If 
a book was well received by a community, while we expect that it must have been 
absurd to the rational members of that community, then one should consider the 
possible irrational motivation that contributed to its good reception. Insofar as the 
book has the capacity to assuage insecurities and enhance self-esteem of the 
members of the community, then the good reception of the book indicates that these 
specific insecurities and self-esteem deficiencies were widespread in its public and 
were likely to manifest themselves in other aspects of public life. They could 
ultimately become, for instance, a major political force as well. An analytic history of 
historiography and scholarship in general thus becomes a means to study various 
sinister and less sinister forces quite outside the world of intellect. 
 
 
Coda. Dostoevsky’s alternative perspective 
 
The analysis of the Romantic worldview in (art) historical scholarship presented 
here relies on a reasonably simple conceptual apparatus: one merely needs to be 
aware of the forces of unconsciousness and understand denials as a tool to 
overcome anxieties—and ask what a certain irrational claim denies in order to grasp 
the painful internal self-esteem management that manifests itself externally as 
irrational hubris and grandiosity. Nevertheless, it is only the psychoanalytic theories 
developed in the second half of the  we   e h ce  u y,    he   h   F eud’s    g   l 
theory of drives, that can provide the basis for this understanding. And if we ask for 
alternative explanations, one must notice that Jean-P ul S    e’s desc  p    s  f f lse 
consciousness or Herbert Fingare  e’s    lys s  f self-deception are of little help, 
because they are too general and do not engage with the self-esteem problems that 
irrational behaviour struggles to resolve.  
There is, however, Dostoevsky, who grasped these mechanisms before 
Freudians. The concept of unconsciousness is described in his Notes from 
Underground: there are some thoughts, we read there, that one shares only with close 
friends; some thoughts one shares with no one, and some thoughts one fears to 
reveal even to oneself.99 In the opening of the Brothers Karamazov Fyodor Karamazov, 
D s  e s y’s p     ype  f      c ss s ,      es      m   s e y w  h h s s  s     s  
for a family advice from the old monk renowned for his wisdom, starets (monastic 
 
99 Fyodor Mihailovich Dostoevsky (Федор Михайлович Достоевский), Записки из подполья (Notes 
from Underground) S . Pe e sbu g: Азбука-Классика, 2006, 83.  
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elder) Zosima.100 At the very beginning of the scene he makes a slip of the tongue of 
the kind that would become known as the Freudian slip in the twentieth century—
he calls himself a king.101 His conversation with the starets is a desperate series of 
attempts to impress that makes everyone present feel embarrassed.102 The old monk, 
who sees through it all, recommends that he avoids lying to himself. Karamazov, 
however, is incapable of engaging with the advice; defence mechanisms take over 
and his exalted praise of the wisdom of the starets is both an attempt to win 
approval and a strategy to avoid the real issue.103 Reactions of this kind are well-
known in psychoanalytic literature as a major hurdle in the treatment of narcissistic 
patients.  
When it comes to the elaboration of his views, Dostoevsky is thus 
comparable to Gombrich: instead of general statements one finds a large number of 
examples from which the general picture needs to be derived. In our present 
situation his views on narcissism can also be attractive because they have 
substantial explanatory potential when it comes to the understanding of the rise of 
social constructivism and anti-realism in the final decades of the twentieth century. 
It is certainly tempting to see in it a Romantic fever generated by the flamboyant 
narcissisms of the generation of 1968. Consider, for instance, a remarkably frank 
statement by Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, Margaret Jacob in a collection of 
postmodernist crème de la crème articles edited by Keith Jenkins. They describe that 
h    g ‘ pp   ched  c dem c c  ee s  s  u s de s’  hey h  e bee  espec  lly 
sensitive to  
 
the ways in which claims to objectivity have been used to exclude us from 
full p    c p          he       ’s publ c l fe,   f  e sh  ed by   he s  f  u  se , 
working-class people, and minorities. We also appreciate that for outsiders, 
skepticism and relativism offer modes of inquiry essential to redressing the 
wrongs of exclusion.104 
 
But certainly, through history, it was always objectivity and the realistic 
comprehension of the situation that was vital for all embattled minorities in order to 
c mb    pp ess   .     b   usly u de m  es   e’s cl  m  h    he e  s  pp ess     f 
one also says that everything is relative. Scepticism and relativism are useless as 
tools to oppose oppression and can only serve to perpetuate it—however, they are 
very helpful when one has to manage a self-esteem injured by claims about 
rationality and objectivity. This is precisely what Dostoevsky calls insult that, as 
starets Zosima observes, can be generated by self-lie, without   y  e’s  e l   sul   g 
action.105 His Notes from Underground indeed describe the state of mind for which the 
 
100 Fyodor Mihailovich Dostoevsky (Федор Михайлович Достоевский), Братья Карамазовы (Brothers 
Karamazov) cited according to the Moscow: Эксмо 2006 edition, 45-85. 
101 Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 47. 
102 Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 48-49. 
103 Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 52. 
104 J yce Appleby,  y   Hu  ,   g  e  J c b: ‘Tell  g  he   u h  b u  h s   y’, Ke  h Je    s, ed., The 
Postmodern History Reader, London: Routledge, 1997, 209-219, 210. 
105 Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 51. 
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 e y p ss b l  y  f  b ec     y  s  he g e  es  p ss ble   sul : ‘N  h  g h s e e  
  sul ed me m  e  h    he l ws  f    u e’ s ys  he m    ch   c e  of this short 
novel.106   
‘ y  g      eself’  s  hus D s  e s y’s byw  d f      c ss sm.  u  
Dostoevsky is a religious thinker and it is ultimately the human relationship with 
God that interests him. For the Orthodox monastic tradition hubris, that which we 
would call narcissism, is a direct sign of demonic possession.107 There are no real 
dem  s    D s  e s y’s    els, bu  hum  s c   choose to be as bad. Free will is 
h gh    D s  e s y’s  ge d . O e c mm   u de s   d  g  f f   h    G d (    ls  
reality, rationality, truth, justice and so on) is that it provides a believer with a way 
to overcome anxieties by giving something firm in life. Both a believer and a non-
believer may agree about this function of religious faith: the former will think that 
such faith is true, while the latter may see in it a mere fantasy constructed to assuage 
anxieties. The understanding is that primordial fear stands at the start of a human life 
 s hum   be  g’s    g   l s   e, wh le        l  e s    g,   u h,  us  ce, se se  f 
 e l  y, ul  m  ely  el g  us bel e e s’ f   h    G d   e    ls   e de el ps      de     
de l w  h   . (The use  f f    sy    m   ge   e’s self-esteem problems would be a 
p    cul  ly despe   e me su e  f  he s me    d.) D s  e s y’s   ew, h we e ,  s 
the obverse of this picture. It is not that people lie to themselves in order to 
overcome fear and anxiety; the starets in Brothers Karamazov explains, people have 
fears and anxieties because they lie to themselves.108 Fears and anxieties, one could 
say, are mere results of lies in the form of the rejection of the primordial faith in God; 
they are not the causes of fall, but its symptoms. Since God is good, there can be no 
place for them in a worldview formed by true faith. 
Not many people, not even religious believers, are likely to find this wider 
picture credible.109 Its specific elaboration, however, relies on and describes the same 
phenomenon of the narcissistic fall as modern psychoanalytic theories. It is fair to 
admit that for the purposes of this paper, its conceptual apparatus could have done 
as good a job as that of modern psychoanalysis; only the implications, because of 
D s  e s y’s emph s s    f ee w ll, w uld have been more explicitly damning. His 
elaboration of the phenomenon speaks a different language from the one we are 
 
106 ‘…законы природы постоянно и более всего всю жизнь меня обижали’. D s  e s y, Notes from 
Unverground, 58. 
107 See for instance John Climacus, Scala paradisi, according to ed. J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus 
completus (series Graeca) (MPG), 88, Paris: 1857-1866: 631-1161, 893b, 948d-980b. 
108 ‘…страх есть лишь последствие всякой лжи’, Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, 65. The starets is 
transmitting the view that can be found in Climacus, Scala, 945a-c. 
109 It contradicts, for instance, any theology that postulates the original sin, following the Vulgata 
mistranslation of Romans 5:12 ‘ἐφ ὦ πάντες ἥμαρτον’ (which suggests that everyone sinned like 
Ad m)  s ‘   qu   m es pec  e u  ’ (wh ch sugges s  h   e e y  e s   ed  h  ugh Ad m’s f  s  s  ). 
Byzantines, and following them the theology of the Orthodox Church to which Dostoevsky belonged, 
relied on the Greek original. For the Orthodox rejection of the original sin see John Meyendorff, 
Byzantine Theology, New York: Fordham University Press 1979, 143-146. 
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used   , bu ,  s p    ed  u  by P  fess   V l  d     h el  ulg    ’s Master and 
Margarita, things do not change because we name them differently.110    
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110 ‘Мы говорим с тобой на разных языках … но вещи, о которых мы говорим от этого не 
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